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While driving on Bakeri Expressway in Tehran in 2016, one of the two authors’ friend, A., 
recalled a protest during the summer of 2009, when the people of Iran took to the streets, 
giving form to what has since come to be known as the ‘Green Movement’.1 In June 2009, 
and for months later, protests took place in several cities across the country against the re-
election of Mahmood Ahmadinejad (r.2005-13) as president of the republic, an election that 
the protesters considered rigged. The ‘Green Movement’, or the fitna (sedition) as it is called 
by the forces that countered it, constituted the fiercest challenge to the stability of the Islamic 
Republic yet. What started as a dispute over the election results spiralled, as the months 
passed by, into a comprehensive confrontation between the opposition and Ahmadinejad’s 
government, with radical fringes aiming their critique at the regime itself.
2
 As A. recalled: 
 
We were in Parkway [an important junction in North Tehran where portraits of martyrs from 
the Iran-Iraq war are at display], and people were shouting “Basiji vaghei Hemmat bodo 
Bakeri” (the real bassij were Hemmat and Bakeri) against the bassij3 that had beaten up their 
brothers and sisters during the protests. The reality is that if Bakeri and Hemmat were alive, 
they would protest with us to defend the truth and honour of the Islamic Republic, which they 
created, and to allow people to protest: how do you think the revolution happened?
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This short excerpt of a longer conversation directly speaks to the relevance of the 
issue of political participation in the Islamic Republic, whose political system synthetises 
authoritarian and democratic characteristics and subsumes political participation as a 
fundamental trait of its history and genealogy, thus offering fertile ground to build arguments 
in favour of expanding it. According to the constitution, in fact, Iranians can participate in 
national politics in a number of ways, from voting to protesting, all of which are rights 
included in the fundamental law.
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 These rights are based on values that resonate not only with 
the Islamic Republic’s historical legacy and revolutionary genesis. They are also religiously 
legitimised by a specific reading of Shi‘ism as a ‘theology of discontent’ and rebellion, which 
turns important religious celebrations, such as Ashura and ta‘zieh, into ‘theatres of protest’. It 
is not surprising, therefore, that such religious celebrations have been politicised and utilised 
to spread revolutionary ideas during the 1970s.
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Political participation, and the right to it, are at the core of what Saïd Amir Arjomand 
defines ‘constitutional politics’, namely ‘the struggle for the definition of social and political 
order [which] takes place among groups and organizations whose interests align them behind 
different principles of order’.7 In fact, political participation, both as a principle and a right, is 
contested yet, crucially, mobilised by pro-regime and oppositional
8
 forces alike. Invocations 
supporting the expansion of the public sphere and the right to political participation may 
come from opposed sides, urging the regime to become more inclusive. Although they may 
have contrasting goals and different nuances, such invocations can have the similar effect of 
challenging, to a varying degree, the current status quo. 
 Our contribution explores such challenges. It argues that the right to political 
participation is a cornerstone of Iran’s governance which, echoing Janine Wedel, Cris Shore, 
Gregory Feldman and Stacy Lathrop,
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 is understood as the ensemble of principles and notions 
sustaining the procedures and structures that govern the interaction between the state and 
society. It follows that governance in a hybrid regime, such is the Islamic Republic,
10
 is 
sustained and regulated by ideational devices that transcend authoritarianism and come to 
terms with ‘non-authoritarian notions’ such as political participation. 
This chapter diverges from the rest of the literature focusing on rights and political 
freedom in Iran. Broadly speaking, most of the literature focusses on the issue of cultural 
relativism and Islam versus the universality of rights and secularism, and whether the 
institutions of the Islamic Republic (the government, the judiciary system, the security forces, 
etc.) respect the citizens’ rights, which come under different labels, be it human rights, 
women and/or minority rights.
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 Complementary to such perspective, scholarship on Iran has 
also examined the efforts of progressive and reform-minded groups and individuals critical of 
the regime to reconcile Islam and different types of rights. Mahmood Monshipouri and Mehdi 
Zakerian, for example, focus their analysis on the struggle of social actors such as NGOs, 
student groups and women to accommodate a secular and a religious understanding of human 
rights.
12
  
The authors of this chapter take a different approach. Rather than examine how ijtihad 
(Islamic interpretation) may be stretched to translate secular liberal rights, we draw on the 
work of Arzoo Osanloo, Mehran Tamadonfar, Naser Ghorbannia among the others, arguing 
that Iran’s legal system is built on both secular and religious epistemologies, and that actors 
willing to advocate for the expansion of rights may build on either. The concepts of politico-
civil rights and democratic participation are inscribed in the history and politics of Iran, and 
reflected in its hybrid legislation.
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 It follows that the right to political participation is part of 
a common background that both oppositional and conservative forces share, although 
differences exist. By examining how it is articulated by different political forces, then, the 
authors seek to reveal the heterogeneous and contested nature of law-making in Iran, 
questioning the notion of a Shari‘ah-based legislation that is, by nature, unchangeable, or 
changeable thanks to religious ijtihad only.  
The analysis at hand focusses on the post-2009 period; that is the period following the 
tenth presidential election in Iran. This election saw unprecedented political action and 
radicalised discourses and demands for political participation. Like the Arab uprisings two 
years later, it produced a suspension of political limitations, offering an opportunity to voice 
discontent and articulate diverse ideological visions present in society.
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 This moment of 
exceptionality was followed by an authoritarian backlash, however, and the post-2009 
securitisation of the public sphere, along with the exclusionary politics and the divisions 
within the elite and the population that ensued from the repression,
15
 led public figures from a 
diverse range of political backgrounds — individuals that the regime regards both as insiders 
and outsiders — to question the discrepancy between the behaviour of the government and 
the principles enshrined in the constitution.  
The 2009-10 protests were a watershed moment in the history of the Islamic Republic: 
what governance arrangements were possible after the society and the ruling elite became so 
polarised as an effect of their de facto exclusion from the ruling institutions and the public 
sphere? This chapter shows that the effort to re-fashion governance after the protests re-
ignited the constitutional debate around the foundation of the Islamic Republic, emphasising 
its epistemological plurality. Individuals calling for the overcoming of social and political 
polarisation, in fact, built their claim on both the secular and the religious nature of Iran’s 
governance structure, rather than stressing its religious tenets exclusively. This suggests that 
in order to explain the ‘pragmatic’ approach to governance dilemmas pillared around 
individual and collective rights that Islamists in power may adopt, it is necessary to 
complement theories centred on Islamic moderation, or analyses pivoted on Islamic 
liberalism, with a richer and multi-sourced understanding of the intersection between politics 
and religion. Adopting such a broadened perspective, the following pages will first discuss 
the centrality of demands for political participation and rights in the history of Iran. This is 
then followed by an analysis of how Iran’s legal hybridity has provided a fertile environment 
for reclaiming political participation as a fundamental right encoded both in history and the 
law. In a third and final section, the chapter illustrates how both oppositional and pro-regime 
forces have utilised such a common historical background and legal plurality to advance the 
demand for a more inclusive political environment, tolerant of diversity, in the post-2009 era. 
 
The genealogy of the ‘right to political participation’ 
The historical and political background 
According to Henry Steiner,
16
 while political participation is widely recognised across a 
broad spectrum of countries as a right, its translation into legal provisions has encountered 
obstacles that are connected to what he calls the different ‘theories of political participation’ 
that dominate in different countries. The principle of political participation grants citizens the 
right to take part, directly or through representatives, in the conduct of public affairs by 
voting in elections and by influencing governmental decision-making. The right to political 
participation itself, therefore, includes different modes of participation. While some, such as 
the right to vote, go unquestioned in the majority of national polities, others, such as the right 
to organise protests and voice dissent publicly, may be a matter of political contention at the 
national and international levels. As will become apparent below, in Iran the right to political 
participation constitutes a pillar of Iran’s dominant political culture, yet also remains deeply 
divisive and contested right.  
The notion of rights (hoquq, sing. haq) has consistently featured across the history of 
modern-day Iran. Constitutional rights, human rights and civil rights are notions around 
which political participation, mobilisations, reform and claims of legitimacy have revolved. 
The public memory of historical events is often based on a rights-centred perspective. Such a 
memory is important because it informs ordinary citizens’ understanding of their own history 
and political agency, becoming relevant to the regime too. Two historical events are of 
particular importance in the Iranian context: the constitutional and the Islamic revolutions. 
The constitutional revolution (1905-11) is usually regarded as the event that brought notions 
such as constitutionalism, political equality and ruler’s accountability to Iran. Yadullah 
Shahibzadeh asserts that this event popularised a democratic language that promoted the idea 
that the ‘people’ consists of citizens with equal political and civil rights (mellat) and 
encouraged Iranians to think and talk about their society through a new vocabulary pillared 
around the notion of rights.
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 Fakhreddin Azimi argues that the constitutional revolution 
incardinated in ordinary Iranians’ worldview the idea that the ruler is bound by a legal 
framework and has to deliver ‘decent governance’.18 The memory of the constitutional 
revolution is still powerful in today’s Iran.19 Intellectuals and politicians consistently refer to 
it in order to legitimise their claims about rights and the rule of law.
20
 Although such claims 
have often sprung from the most progressive pockets of the elite, or the so-called reformist 
factions, the historical memory of the constitutional revolution is also used by conservative 
political forces. In this case, ideas such as nationalism and the right to self-determination, 
along with religious democracy, are celebrated. The figure of Sheik Fazlollah Nouri — a 
prominent religious scholar who supported constitutionalism yet denounced its later 
perversion into a ‘Westernised’ and secular political project — is particularly relevant to the 
conservative reading of the event, also because Nouri was eventually condemned to death by 
the more ‘liberal’ constitutionalist factions.21  
The memory and legacy of the 1979 revolution too are presented as a struggle for 
rights by reformist/progressive, conservative and pro-regime forces alike, although 
differences exist between them. Indeed, while all forces emphasise the role of popular 
protests in defying the dictatorship of the Shah (estebdad), the conservative reading 
underlines more forcefully the role of Islam as the source of inspiration for such justice-
seeking political actions. For example, in a speech to a bassij gathering in October 2011, the 
Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei contextualised the experience of the Islamic revolution in a 
political and religious effort to attain a superior religious form of mardomsalari, or 
democracy. While he recognised that different political ideologies, from liberalism to 
socialism, have positive aspects, he argues that Islam is the sum of them all and that the 
revolution has implemented their positive aspects through Islam. It follows that more than a 
struggle for rights, liberal freedoms and social justice, the revolution was a struggle for 
Islam.
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 Reformist and progressive forces, on their part, propose a reading of the revolution 
emphasising its rights-oriented and justice-seeking nature, often turning celebrations 
commemorating the revolution into an occasion to re-affirm demands for political inclusion. 
In a tense political environment, characterised by a steady contention against the conservative 
forces, during his speech on the twenty-fifth anniversary of the revolution, the reformist ex-
president Mohammad Khatami (r.1997-2005) warned the conservatives that ignoring the 
desire for political participation and inclusion, and perpetuating exclusion of political forces 
critical of the regime, betrays the ideals of the revolution and alienates popular support.
23
 A 
similar argument is suggested by a political advertisement circulated after Hassan Rouhani 
was elected to the presidency of the republic for the first time in 2013. The advert conveyed a 
message of national reconciliation and political tolerance after the 2009 crisis and featured 
excerpts from speeches by prominent political personalities of Iran’s history, from Ayatollah 
Khomeini, the leader of the 1979 revolution and the first Supreme Leader of the Islamic 
Republic, to the former Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh, who nationalised Iran’s oil 
company and was overthrown by a coup orchestrated with the help of the UK in 1953, and 
Ayatollah Taleqani, a democratic leader during the 1979 revolution, who talk about the right 
of Iranians to be the ‘masters of their own future’.24 These examples suggest that the right to 
political participation is relevant to the memory of different political forces in Iran, which use 
it to both voice criticism of the regime and celebrate it.  
 
Legal hybridity  
While historical public memory plays an important role in engendering demands for rights, it 
is not the only source available to extend demands for more inclusive political participation. 
In fact, the codification of the law in the post-revolutionary era, despite claiming to return to 
Islam, is characterised by legal pluralism and references to a number of epistemologies, both 
secular and religious, which also offer opportunity to extend such demands.  
Arzoo Osanloo explains in this regard that, after the 1979 revolution, the willingness 
to bridge the structure of the newly established republican state and the ideological 
underpinnings of Shari‘ah could not solve the dilemma of how to administer the new law. As 
a legal codification became necessary, the leaders of the Islamic Republic decided to 
administer Shari‘ah through the European civil law system, which had been the model of 
judicial organisation during the previous regime.
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 Additionally, Mehran Tamadonfar notes 
that the legislation derived from Shari‘ah primary sources was developed by scholars who 
focussed on the area of private law and had very little to say about public law or affairs of the 
state. These private laws traditionally formulated rules that could resolve disputes around 
sales, contracts and matters of worship, but could not be stretched to include areas such as 
governance, administration or finance.
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 The irony here is that those supposed to bring down 
the Westernised, corrupt legal system inherited from pre-1979 Iran, with its corollary of 
morally corrupted values, contributed to reinforce it.
27
  
It follows that what was made available to the population was a hybrid legal system 
which includes both Islamic, Shari‘ah-based provisions as well as the secular remnants from 
the pre-revolutionary regime. This allowed the co-existence of a double legal epistemology, 
one based on religion and one based on a liberal and secular understanding of rights. Counter-
hegemonic discourses or critiques that are pillared around the notion of rights may therefore 
combine the two. On such basis, Osanloo emphasises in her work that the expansion of 
women’s rights in realms such as divorce or child custody goes beyond any efforts to 
reconcile Islam and liberalism or expand religious interpretation, as it is usually asserted 
within scholarship. Rights advocates, in fact, draw on legal hybridity — or what she terms 
‘Islamico-civil law’— and often on the secular nature of legal provisions, to make claims to 
the Islamic republican state and its institutions.
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Beyond women’s rights, another instance of such legal hybridity is the contested 
participation of Iran in the secular and liberal international legal order on the matter of human 
rights. The Islamic Republic has ratified multiple international rights conventions yet, at the 
same time, these rights regimes face strong and ongoing criticism from the country’s political 
elites. As Iran ratified international conventions and treaties, it had to establish domestic 
institutions tasked with guaranteeing their implementation and respect.
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 This is the case for 
example with the Settad-e Hoquq-e Bashar (Iranian High Council for Human Rights, 
IHCHR), which was established after Iran became a signatory to the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in 1975.
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This council embodies Iran’s compliance with international norms, but is also used to 
denounce the flaws of liberal-secular international law and elevate an Islamic understanding 
of rights, while reversing the accusations of rights violations made against Iran in the 
international arena. An example of this are the declarations of Mohammad Javad Larijani, 
secretary of the IHCHR, at the presentation of the fourth report on human rights in Iran, 
authored by the United Nations (UN) Special Rapporteur Ahmad Shaheed in 2013. In order 
to reverse the UN allegations, Larijani accused Western governments to be violators too. As 
reported by Iran’s PressTV, these counter-accusations were echoed by other Iranian experts 
too who pointed at the repression of anti-austerity protests by European governments as 
examples of such violations,
31
 thus implicitly recognising human rights as a norm worth 
respecting. In yet another speech, however, Larijani strongly criticised the liberal 
international norm of human rights itself, along with the UN. In response to accusations of 
human rights violations, he asserted that those allegations have the only purpose of justifying 
the very existence of the UN and, consequently, safeguarding US and European world 
hegemony, of which the UN are an agent.
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 The Islamic Republic, Larijani argues in the same 
intervention, built a socio-political system based on Islamic rationality, rather than secular 
liberal rationality. Yet, as discussed in this chapter, its legal system is significantly informed 
by secular laws.  
The celebration of the superiority of Islamic human rights is a common theme. These 
are seen as more complete and comprehensive because they have a divine and thus infallible 
meta-foundation, whereas universal human rights have a human origin which is 
epistemologically flawed. As one deputy of the parliament’s Commission for National 
Security and Foreign Policy (CNSFP) argued: ‘universal human rights are materialistically 
defined, and they consider only the worldly rights of human beings, but Islam considers both: 
worldly rights and also moral and afterlife rights’.33 These words are echoed by Morteza 
Rezaeian, a contributor to the website ‘Hawzah.net’ — a website established by state-
sponsored religious centres in Mashad and Qom providing interpretation (tafsir) of the 
Qur’an34 — who asserts that 
 
[a]ll the articles brought up in the declarations of human rights exclusively refer to the 
material aspect of human life and there is no sign of human moral rights, while in the school 
of Islam, the human’s social identity is recognised in morality and beliefs, and it holds that 
moral and ethical rules are rights of spiritual life and are stabilised in the human, and when 
they are, material rights will be retained as well in a proper manner.
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The presence of a double epistemological nature of Iran’s law is here evident, and 
institutions such as the IHCHR have a double function. On the one side, they keep Iran 
embedded in a secular and liberal international legal order. On the other side, they give Iran’s 
policymakers involved in that very international order a forum to condemn it, while 
glorifying a nativist-Islamic version of human rights. However, to those willing to condemn 
the Islamic Republic’s human rights record and the state’s authoritarian interventions, the 
IHCHR provides the opportunity to do so on a secular base, because the council implicitly 
recognises that the liberal international norm of human rights matters, well-representing the 
institutional and legal hybridity of Iran’s governance. 
 
Contending the right to political participation  
The challenge coming from the outsiders  
As discussed, disputes around the right to political participation are core to domestic politics 
and law-making in the Islamic Republic, given its history and the opportunities for reclaiming 
rights provided by its legal hybridity. Additionally, the end of the Iran-Iraq war (1980-8) 
resulted in the emergence of a less securitised socio-political environment, precipitating the 
spread of contentious practices and political ideas. Since the end of the war in 1988 in fact, 
major socio-economic changes have occurred, along with the blooming of limited political 
plurality. At the elite level, these transformations originated from within the so-called Islamic 
left since early 1990s, namely when it was marginalised by rival political factions causing a 
re-thinking of its standpoints on a number of issues.
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 As a corollary of elite factionalism, a 
quasi-institutionalised and routinised network of intellectuals, academics, theologians, jurists, 
political strategists and journalists associated to the Islamic left — among whom were 
Abdolkarim Soroush, Abbas Abdi, Said Hajjarian, Akbar Ganji, Mohsen Kadivar, 
Mohammad Mojtahed Shabestari and others — critically reviewed their previous positions 
and turned to a rights-friendly, almost liberal, vision of the world.
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 The 1997 election of the 
reformist Khatami to the presidency catapulted such visions into the wider public sphere, 
enraging the conservative establishment that reacted with arrests, repression and censorship. 
Khatami’s supporters and like-minded intellectuals were labelled as gheyr-e khodi, or 
outsiders, in order to emphasise that their ideas were alien to the principles of the Islamic 
Republic and fell outside the constitution. On such basis, the Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi, a 
hard-liner, called for ‘shutting the mouth’ of reformist intellectuals and their supporters.38 
Khatami’s two consecutive governments allowed for the emergence of, and gave resonance 
to, demands for enlarging political inclusion and participation. After Khatami’s mandates 
came to an end and a conservative government under Mahmood Ahmadinejad was elected, 
these demands survived and, to some extent, radicalised, creating the necessary social and 
activist environment for the ‘Green Movement’ protests.39  
The role played by legal hybridity in legitimising such demands for political 
participation and legal reform is well-represented by the reliance on liberal and secular rights, 
as enshrined in international conventions, by the campaign group Yek Milyun Emza bara-ye 
Laghv-e Qavanin-e Tab‘iz Amiz (One Million Signature Campaign, OMSC). The OMSC 
sought to collect one million signatures in support of granting women equal legal status with 
men, thus departing from the Islamic principle of complementarity between men and women. 
For the two years since its establishment in 2006,
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 it endured harsh repression by 
conservative authorities and security forces. Noushin Ahmadi Khorasani, one of the founders 
of the campaign, explains that ‘the reconciliation of Islam and feminism in the Campaign is 
the reconciliation of feminism with millions of Muslims who live with their religion, but who 
do not seek to draw their power, identity, and legitimacy from it’.41 She continues arguing 
that  
 
[t]he fifth generation of “circumstantial” feminists we see in Iran today are not, by and large, 
a group that first asks whether or not something is Islamic before deciding what to make of it. 
They are not anti-Islamic, but they have distanced themselves from struggles over political 
and religious authority (the Islamic Republic claims both), and they base their activities on 
their practical demands rather than on concerns about identity or ideology.
42
  
 
Ahmadi Khorasani states that the campaign is not interested in contributing to the 
project of Islamic feminism either, because it is not ‘willing to value ideological correctness 
over the primary demands of women’.43 The campaign took inspiration from the Convention 
on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) which was 
ratified by the Iranian parliament in 2003, but later rejected by the Guardian Council for its 
incompatibility with Shari‘ah. The resilience of the inspiration provided by the CEDAW is 
also evident in the statement of the ‘Coalition of Iranian Women’s Movement for Voicing 
their Demands in the Election’ which regrouped activists from the OMSC following 
repression. The coalition detailed its demands to the candidates of the 2009 presidential 
election, the first one being the ratification of the CEDAW.
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Alongside legal hybridity, Iran’s revolutionary legacy also provided the gheyr-e khodi 
with the necessary ideological grounds for advancing their criticism of, and demands 
towards, the regime. One such example concerns the declarations of the two ‘accidental 
leaders’ of the ‘Green Movement’, Mir Hussein Moussavi and Mehdi Karroubi, who despite 
their participation in the revolution and institutional life of the Islamic Republic, are 
considered outsiders by the conservative elite in power.
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 They have consistently referred to 
the national history and revolutionary legacy to justify their demands for change and political 
participation. For instance, in his statement number 18, Moussavi states that 
 
[w]e are still standing tall and proud on the first anniversary of the tenth presidential elections 
despite our whipped body, which endures bruises and imprisonments. Our demands are the 
same: freedom, social justice and the formation of [legitimate] national governance. We are 
confident of victory, hoping for the will and support of God, because we have not demanded 
anything other than the restoration of our national rights […] Today, people know those who 
have trampled on the basic rights of the nation. People are aware of repeated violations of 
human rights and the lack of human dignity within the judiciary and intelligence division. 
People are aware of how far the totalitarians have advanced in desecrating common national 
legacies, especially with regards to fundamental human rights.
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Poor respect for the law and the constitution, which is understood as the source of 
rights, is equated to un-Islamic and anti-revolutionary attitudes. In his statement 
commemorating the anniversary of the birth of the ‘Green Movement’, Karroubi asserts that:  
 
This year we were unfortunately lacking in the [recognition of the] people’s rights under the 
Constitution. Instead, these fundamental rights were replaced by extreme repression through 
brutal force, which had no regard for the sanctity of life. Despite all this darkness and 
bitterness, we still remain hopeful that the train which has been derailed from the foundations 
of our Constitution, our Revolution and our Imam, will return to its original path; that the 
wrong-doers repent and, in doing so, pave the way for dialogue and interaction.
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He continues: 
 
Who from the beginning [could have] interpreted the assertion of justified demands and the 
inquiry into [our] votes to be counter to the velayat-e faqih?
48
 Why, by means of the velayat-e 
faqih, has a hatchet been taken to the very roots of the Constitution and the Islamic Republic, 
both of which were founded on the people’s votes? Why has the authority of the velayat-e 
faqih been so greatly extended? I doubt that so much authority and power were given to the 
Prophets themselves, or the infallible [Shiʿa] Imams. I even doubt that God considers himself 
to have the right to deal with his servants in the same way [that the Supreme Leader does]! 
Historically, Shiʿa Islam considers criticism of the ruler not only necessary but a requirement 
based on the Sharia law stipulation that describes advising the leader of Muslims.
49
 
 
Karroubi and Moussavi not only appeal to the revolutionary legacy to legitimise their 
demands. They also draw on Iran’s legal hybridity, given that they discuss the constitution 
and the rights guaranteed by it both as a worldly and religious matter. Ironically, Karroubi 
suggests that the current amount of power vested in the Supreme Leader Khamenei exceeds 
that of God. They both pledge loyalty to Islam, the revolution and Khomeini, and place those 
who ordered and carried out the repression of the protests in 2009 outside of the constitution 
and the revolutionary tradition. In so doing, they seek to reclaim the revolution and its ideals, 
based on people’s democratic rights, somehow reversing the accusation that they are the 
gheyr-e khodi, or outsiders in Iranian politics.  
 
The challenge coming from the insiders 
As discussed, the repression of the 2009 protests became a real watershed moment in Iran’s 
contemporary history and gheyr-e khodis were not alone in questioning the Supreme Leader 
Khamenei and the government on their respect of Iranians’ rights. In fact, khodi people, or 
the insiders, have been critical too.
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 A substantial blow to the regime came from amidst the 
martyrs’ families. In Iran, the memory of the Iran-Iraq war is perpetuated and reproduced by 
the daily remembrance of the martyrs or shahidan (sing. shahid). Not only the capital Tehran 
and other minor cities are full of murals and portrays of those who gave their life in the war, 
but a potent ensemble of museums, mausoleums, and civil rituals is tasked with keeping their 
memory alive. Considering this, the critical stance that some of the family members of well-
known martyrs took after the repression in 2009-10, represented a significant challenge for 
the regime, which had to face disapproval coming from a category of khodi par excellence.  
As mentioned earlier in the chapter, one slogan chanted during the protests in 2009-10 
was ‘Basiji vaghei Hemmat bodo Bakeri’,51 meaning that the real bassij were those who gave 
their life to defend Iran during the war, as the martyrs Mohammad Ebrahim Hemmat and 
Mehdi Bakeri had done, and not those who repressed their brothers and sisters during the 
peaceful protests. The Bakeri family is famous in Iran as it gave three young brothers to the 
struggle against the Shah first and against Iraq later. Hamid Bakeri’s daughter Assieh, during 
a speech at the University of Tehran in the autumn of 2009, declared that ‘[i]f my father and 
my uncle were alive today, they would have not tolerated these atrocities carried out in the 
name of the martyrs by the bassij against the people. If they were alive today they would be 
in prison’.52 Other family members too reacted to the crackdown on protesters by raising 
criticism of the regime. Assieh’s mother, Hamid Bakeri’s widow Fatemeh Amirani, publicly 
criticised Ali Jafari — the commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) of 
which her husband was a commander during the war — for repressing the protests. In a 
public letter to Jafari, she described the re-election of Ahmadinejad as a coup d’état and 
warned that the violence against protesters would only cause damage to the regime, which 
would eventually lose its legitimacy. Confirming that today’s bassij are different from the 
bassij during the Iran-Iraq war, Amirani also wrote that the asymmetry of power between the 
Shah’s regime and the people was less dramatic than the one in the Islamic Republic today, 
where one side ‘has all the means of power and the other side [the people] [is] without any 
power’.53 The sister of the three martyred Bakeri brothers, Zahra, also made her voice heard 
in a letter to the Iranian authorities, in which she compared imprisonment during the Shah’s 
time and after the revolution. She concluded that, while today family members have no right 
to talk to lawyers or have information, before the revolution they could even talk to 
international human rights organisations and denounce unlawful detentions.
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 The Bakeri 
family paid for their outspoken criticism with arrests and harassment, along with members of 
other martyrs’ families such as the Hemmat family.55  
Other examples of ‘internal criticism’ have come from two well-known intellectual 
figures, namely Mohammad Nourizad and Emad Afrough. Nourizad is a former columnist of 
the hard-line newspaper Keyhan and a film director, while Afrough is a conservative 
intellectual and former MP. Nourizad, who was imprisoned after his initial criticism of the 
crackdown, wrote fifteen open letters to Khamenei in which he defended the right of the 
people to protest and have their criticism answered, not merely repressed: ‘I am saying that 
when it is accepted […] that protesting is people’s rights, this protest will not necessarily lead 
to our downfall. We should understand this not take this right away from people’.56  
Afrough pushed his criticism as far as to discuss and criticise the rule of the Supreme 
Leader during an interview on state TV in January 2012. While talking about the notion of 
mardomsalari dini (religious democracy), he emphasised that this is composed of two distinct 
aspects, namely religious rule and the democratic legitimacy of it, underlining that religious 
rule has to be accepted by the people. He then discussed the notion according to which divine 
and human government are bridged together through a leader, as indicated by the role models 
of the Imam Ali and Khomeini, and today by Khamenei. During this discussion, he declared 
however that ‘there must be guarantees [as] the country can’t be ruled by one single leader, 
by one single person’. He added in fact that ‘we have to rule considering the people’s rights’ 
and called for an active questioning of the rule of the Supreme Leader who has to respond, or 
else being ‘automatically dismissed’.57 
Criticism came from the security forces as well. Hossein Alaei, a retired IRGC 
general and a war hero, authored an op-ed published in January 2012 in the newspaper 
Etela‘at in which he implicitly compared the current situation in Iran with the one during the 
Shah’s time. He suggested that the Shah and Khamenei may have commonalities when it 
comes to the way they treat political opponents, and referred to the house arrest of dissidents, 
implicitly talking about Karroubi and Moussavi. The article featured a series of questions 
such as ‘If, instead of placing some [prominent political figures] under house arrest, sending 
others to exile, and jailing political activists, [the Shah] had opened a dialogue with them, 
would [he] have been forced to flee the country?’58 The letter sparked debate and criticism of 
Alaei, against whom sit-ins and open letters were organised and published. He later declared 
that his op-ed was misinterpreted.  
Like outsiders, insiders too have drawn on secular and religious references to justify 
demands for extending the right to political participation to dissidents and excluded political 
figures. They, who highlighted that being insiders does not necessarily equate with 
supporting the violent repression of the ‘Green Movement’ or being anti-democratic, have in 
fact referred to the right of the people to protest and to the tenets of a democratic government, 
invoking principles of legal plurality and discussing historical examples relevant to today’s 
Iranian elite. 
 
Conclusion 
Like the Arab uprisings, the ‘Green Movement’ represented a moment of exception, with the 
Iranian society witnessing an unprecedented opportunity to express a diverse range of 
political opinions without significant limitations. However, this moment did not last long and 
soon violent repression quashed the street protests. What governance is possible after such 
disruptive/repressive events? As this chapter sought to illustrate, calls for enlarging political 
participation have aimed at overcoming social and political polarisation, resulting in the 
strengthening of both the secular and the religious legal-political epistemologies that inform 
Iran’s governance system. Indeed, in line with scholars arguing that the Islamic Republic has 
paradoxically accelerated a process of secularisation,
59
 this chapter demonstrated how secular 
and liberal referents have been mobilised in order to reclaim the right to political participation 
by different categories of citizens and political elites following the 2009-10 repression. As 
securitisation threatened to close down the public sphere in the post-2009 era, secular-
inspired demands for political inclusion expressed by ‘insiders’ of the regime have become 
even more significant in highlighting the plurality of Iran’s governance foundations.  
While this ‘secular’ discourse has by no means surpassed Islam as the predominant 
source of legitimacy for the ruling elite, or as a moral compass in society, this analysis 
suggests that a number of ideological and linguistic frameworks are at work to articulate the 
need to strike a ‘governance balance’ between the regime’s security and the right to political 
participation.  
Based on these findings, this chapter calls for a pluralistic approach to the study of the 
choices that Islamists in power make when it comes to governance, emphasising that the 
ideological foundations informing governance arrangements are hybrid. Therefore, they offer 
a diversified epistemological background to build the case for revising governance 
arrangements beyond Islam, even in contexts that are seemingly rigid such as that of the 
Islamic Republic of Iran. 
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